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Abstract:  
This research aims to develop a framework to explore the conditions of trust between 
the ALT and AMT relationship within project alliancing. This research also aims to 
develop a robust trust framework which can improve the understanding of the theory to 
support trust in alliancing, in particular the ALT and AMT relationship to improve 
project success factors. Research in trust within the construction industry has not yet 
examined how the relational signals within the five situations in the normative 
framework identified by Siegwart Lindenberg affect the level of trustworthiness 
between partners. More research is necessary to explore potential frameworks that can 
be used as the basis for future research in trust. Data from previous research in the 
performance of alliance has been used to verify the proposed framework. The 
framework will be developed in the ALT and AMT relationship to improve project 
success factors within the alliance. The originality of this research is trying to 
understand trust in the context of project alliancing in Australia as there are an 
increasing number of construction projects using the alliancing procurement method. 
Additionally, this research is examining the conditions of trust from the ALT and AMT 
teams specifically formed for the collaboration of project alliancing.   
Keywords: 
project alliancing, procurement, trust  
1 Introduction 
Research on project alliancing in Australia have revealed that communication and trust 
between the Alliance Leadership Team (ALT) and Alliance Management Team (AMT) 
was a major issue that impacted on the effectiveness of the alliance (Mills & Harley 
2010). The precondition for project alliancing to be successful is to develop a trust 
framework that allows the ALT and AMT to deliver superior project management 
coordination.  
An empirical study (Smyth, 2005) of construction projects demonstrated that 
performance derived from trust was related to individuals rather than project factors. 
Conditions of trust have been examined for clients/consultants and contractors and 
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results have found (Wong et al, 2003) that trusting behaviours on behalf of contractors 
has a significant correlation with the trust level of contractors as perceived by 
client/consultant. Contractors are more cautious towards trusting behaviours by the 
client which means that contractors trust less than the clients therefore research should 
concentrate on building trust from the contractor perspective to improve the client 
relationship.  
Furthermore, other results (Smyth, 2005) have indicated that clients do not have 
extremely high expectations but this does not translate that they are satisfied with the 
service delivered by the contractor (Smyth, 2005). 
This research aims to develop a framework to explore the conditions of trust between 
AMT and ALT relationship within project alliancing. This research also aims to develop 
a robust trust framework which can improve the understanding of the theory to support 
trust in alliancing, in particular the AMT and ALT relationship to improve project 
success factors. The results will demonstrate the conditions of trust which affect 
cooperative attitude under the five situations identified by Siegwart Lindenberg (2000) 
which affect the levels of trust and how these conditions of trust that can be embedded 
in the ALT and AMT teams for project alliancing are impacted. 
1.1 Nature of Relationship contracting 
Two influential reports on the review of the construction industry of U.K. was published 
in 1994; The Latham Report-Constructing the Team and The Egan Report-Rethinking 
Construction (Cheung, 2007). The Latham report recommended that contracts should be 
founded upon principles of fairness, mutual trust and teamwork rather than mistrust and 
confrontation (Latham, 1994). The Egan report identified fragmentation as an issue to 
procurement practice and suggested that partnering and collaborative efforts should be 
used to resolve problems (Egan, 1998). 
The paradigm for cooperative contracting has continued to evolve from traditional 
procurement to partnering and now to project alliancing. Each of the procurement 
contracting models is a risk management strategy and an attempt to mitigate adversarial 
attitude between project participants. In the traditional model, owners try to transfer as 
much of the risk as possible to others (Ross,1999). 
Moore (1999) suggests that partnering is about management of relationships that are 
trust-based. Successful partnering requires mutual trust, effective communication, 
commitment from senior management, clear understanding of different parties‟ roles, 
consistency of objectives and flexibility to change. Factors which hinder the successful 
use of partnering are: non-compromising tendering process, poor perceptions of the 
partnering process, lack of knowledge and skill to adopt partnering as well as non-
commitment of parties (Cheung et al, 2003). Unbalanced risk allocations in traditional 
contract provisions create adversarial relationships between project participants 
(Cheung et al, 2003). Contract provisions are often rigidly interpreted without taking 
into account of parties‟ needs and construction difficulties (Cheung et al, 2003; Piper, 
2001). When liability is uncertain, responsibilities are allocated to parties on the basis of 
administrative conveniences which can hinder problem solving and the tendency for 
parties to revert to their contractual positions (Cheung et al, 2003). For the reasons 
stated partnering may not be the best procurement option due to the inherent conflicting 
objectives of the contracting parties (Cheung et al, 2003). 
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Project alliancing is used to deliver large complex projects in the field of resources, 
infrastructure and building (Ross, 1999). Complex projects have higher uncertainty in 
risks, diverse stakeholder interests, changing business, political influence and rapid 
technological change. These circumstances cannot be smoothly dealt with by the 
traditional risk-transfer contracting models including Public-Private partnerships (PPP) 
(Ross, 1999). 
1.2 Nature of project alliancing  
The Construction Industry Institute Australia (CIIA 1996) and Larson and Drexler 
(1997) suggested that developing trust was pivotal to the success of project partnering. 
Project alliancing in relational contracting is similar to partnering in that an entity is 
formed for the purpose of achieving mutual goals in the delivery of the project but this 
method is mainly used for infrastructure and mega projects where there is high level of 
complexity as well as opportunity for innovation therefore, more research is needed to 
explore how trust affects the AMT and ALT teams which are formed specifically for the 
purpose of project alliancing. 
In alliancing each alliance member places their profit margin and reward structure “at 
risk” this the entire alliance entity either benefits together or lose all (Walker et al, 
2002). This then creates a motivation to collaborate and cooperate within the alliance 
relationship. Alliances work on the principles of mutual trust, commitment and 
communication to reduce conflict and enhance productivity and overall performance 
(Lee & Cavusgil, 2006).  
Project alliancing differs from partnering in that it achieves unity of purpose between 
project teams. In an alliance, the project price is developed by a pool of professionals 
through innovation in design with agreed risk and reward sharing arrangement (Walker 
et al, 2002). Cost savings are expected from improved value for money through the 
leverage of skills and expertise of the alliance partners in innovative construction from 
project conception through to project delivery. The idea relies on a “best value” 
outcome rather than least expensive cost or quickest project outcome (Walker et al, 
2002). 
The agreed project price is determined only when the alliance partners have been 
selected. Contract variations from scope changes does not substantially arise due to the 
alliance’s work in pre-planning and defining the project scope before agreeing the risk 
and reward arrangements (Walker et al, 2002). Variations that do occur must 
demonstrate substantial changes in the project scope and on site variations are managed 
by the alliance team. 
There are two teams which are formed in an alliance: The Alliance Management Team 
(AMT) in charge of the operation of the project and the The Alliance Leadership Team 
(ALT) team which are in charge of the strategic decision making of the project as well 
as supporting the AMT team (Mills & Harley, 2010). The ALT team includes the client 
and determines the Turn Out Cost (TOC), which is the agreed amount the building 
would cost to deliver (Walker et al, 2002). The AMT would include a personnel from 
the contractor’s side. Both AMT and ALT teams would have representatives from both 
the client and contactors’ side to facilitate equity, knowledge as well as collaborative 
spirit in decision making.  
A base target cost is established from an agreement on a risk and reward formula where 
an open-book accounting approach is undertaken to determine cost reimbursement 
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together with agreed and verified site management costs (Walker et al, 2002). The 
firm’s profit margin (determined from audited figures over an agreed period) is placed 
as an “at risk” component to ensure the agreed project costs are met. Bonuses are shared 
by all parties to encourage further innovation (Walker, et al, 2002).  
Purcell and Ross (2005) consider that project alliancing is generally suitable for projects 
which are complex, high-risks, have strict time lines, myriad of stakeholders issues and 
external threats. 
Infrastructure projects involve a high degree of integration between design, construction 
and operations groups (Mills & Harley, 2010). The intense integration of the alliance 
members require excellent communication skills at a personal, business and operational 
level (Walker et al, 2002). Research on project alliancing in Australia have revealed that 
communication and trust between the Alliance Leadership Team (ALT) and Alliance 
Management Team (AMT) was a major issue that impacted on the effectiveness of the 
alliance (Mills & Harley, 2010). The precondition for project alliancing to be successful 
is to develop a trust framework that allows the ALT and AMT to deliver superior 
project management coordination. 
2 Trust in Construction Procurement  
Construction is a highly risky activity where there are high levels of trust and distrust 
occurring simultaneously due to uncertainties in the time restraint, resource investment 
and complexity of the design and build of each project (She, 2008). External factors 
such as escalating prices of raw material, changes in building legislations and 
regulations, community protest, adverse weather conditions as well as macroeconomic 
changes in the financial market (interest rates) can affect the original plans of the project 
(She et al, 2010). In addition, internal interruptions such as management restructuring, 
industrial relation disputes, site issues, personnel changes, significant documentation 
changes or errors, incompatibility personality classes between contractor and consultant 
resulting to conflicts can also create delays, disputes and obstacles to the timely 
completion of the project within the specified quality, agreed cost and any other criteria 
which may have been documented in the contract (She, 2008).   
The nature of construction activity as well as industry dynamics forces everyone 
involved in the project to make shrewd calculations on potential gain versus loss and 
this calculation is largely dependent on the belief of ones’ own judgment of the other 
party’s behaviour in the collaboration under risky situations as discussed above (She, 
2008). In another words, trust for construction personnel is a psychological construct 
which is in a constant state of change depending on the circumstances that arises 
therefore, it is naive to postulate that trust between parties without any element of 
mistrust suspicion occurring at the same can be possible in the delivery process of the 
project (Rousseau et al, 1998; Lindenberg, 2000).  
2.1 Definition of trust 
Trust has been defined by different scholars over the years as predictability on human 
behaviour (Cheung et al, 2003). For the nature of the construction industry as discussed 
above, the following definition of trust by Robinson’s (1996) is most applicable to this 
research which is investigating the stability of trust within the ALT and AMT 
relationship in project alliancing. 
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“ Trust is “one’s expectations, assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that 
another’s future actions will be beneficial, favourable, or at least not detrimental 
to one’s interest” (Robinson, 1996).  
 
Robinson’s (1996) definition of trust isn’t the most optimistic outlook but it implies that 
even if parties are not absolutely considerate of each other’s interests at least their 
actions will not be detrimental to the extent that it would break the partnership of shared 
goals. This allows legitimate inherent mistrust to co-exist with trust and so it is the 
stability of trust at any given point of time or situation that can be measured to 
determine the intention of future behaviour. 
There are several advantages of trust in construction project relationship. According to 
Karlsen & Mssaoud (2008), the advantages of having trust are time saving, solving 
problems informally, encourage motivation for cooperation, openness between parties 
in sharing knowledge, being honest, predicting more accurate risks within the project as 
well as allowing direct speech to occur. 
2.2 Volatility of trust in five situations of any cooperative project (Lindenberg, 
2000) 
A normative frame is important for trust in a business relationship. It largely suspends 
opportunistic behaviour when interests are aligned. Legitimate mistrust is the perceived 
likelihood that a potential or actual transaction partner’s interests are not aligned with 
one’s own interests and that the partner’s actions are driven by a salient gain frame such 
that relational and normative considerations are pushed into the background 
(Lindenberg, 2000). Mistrust is different from distrust. Scholars understand distrust to 
be the “expectation that others will not act in one’s best interests, even engaging in 
potentially injurious behaviour (Govier, 1994;Lewicki & McAllister, 1998) and the 
‘expectation that capable and responsible behaviour from specific individuals will not 
be forthcoming (Barber, 1983;Lewicki & McAllister, 1998). 
Distrust is when a party has a negative reaction towards another party’s action or 
transmitted message regardless of the actual intention of the party as it is doubting 
someone’s honesty. Mistrust is when there is lack of confidence or doubt as there may 
be a hidden agenda but not necessarily imply that there is serious malicious suspicion. 
Mistrust can occur in a positive state of a relationship and may even assist in the 
building of trust as parties may communicate more openly regarding potential issues 
before the commencement of the partnership but distrust is a negative attitude and 
signifies that there is an issue or conflict that needs to be resolved in a trustworthy 
manner or else all endeavours to build trust within a relationship would be rendered 
ineffective.  
In the highly adversarial construction industry, there are currently high levels of distrust 
beyond legitimate inherent mistrust. It is distrust which is hindering trust building. 
There are five situations identified by Siegwart Lindenberg (2000) which ask for 
sacrifice for the relation. These situations are: 
2.2.1 Common good situation:  
both parties will contribute to the common good even if one party could freeride (the 
minimal amount of contribution expected for solidary behaviour varies in terms of 
money, effort and time etc 
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2.2.2 Sharing situation:  
if there are joint divisible benefits and costs and if one party is the one who can divide 
them, that party will not seek to maximise what he gets from the benefit and minimise 
what he gets from the costs but take his “fair share” of both (what the “fair share” is 
varies). 
2.2.3 Need situation:  
one party will help the other party in times of need ( what constitutes need and how 
much help is minimally expected for solidary behaviour varies) 
2.2.4 Breach temptation:  
one party refrain from hurting the other party even at a cost to himself (the minimal 
amount of cost expected for solidary behaviour varies) 
2.2.5 Mishap situation:  
acts can be intended solidary but factually turn out to go against the expectation of 
solidary behaviour. In that case, one party will show that the meant to act differently, 
that he feels sorry that it turned out that way, and he will make amends if the mishap has 
caused damage to others. Also if that party knows in advance that he will not be able to 
keep to the agreement, he will warn others in advance, so that they can mitigate the 
damage.  
People in a normative frame want to act “appropriately” therefore, they want to follow 
the norms that are appropriate in these situations and act according to these norms 
(Lindenberg, 2000).. This way, they will always come to the same expectations in each 
of the five solidarity situations. Behaviour in these five situations is important for the 
relational signals it gives off. If all these signals are positive, the normative is stable and 
the partner is trustworthy (Wielers, 1993). Partners can monitor other behaviour via 
these relational signals and reduce monitoring costs. 
In an empirical research that has been conducted by Mills & Harley (2010) examining 
the perception of alliance performance in public sector infrastructure, a range of factors 
has been identified where AMT and ALT performed above and below expectations. 
Overall, the respondents were more critical of the performance of the ALT with more 
than two thirds of respondents believing that the ALT did not perform above 
expectations. The results found that ALT need to perform not only at strategic levels but 
also be proactively involved in project issues and providing supportive operational 
environments to delivery successful project management (Mills & Harley, 2010). It 
would be beneficial to examine the specific issues under the five situations in light of 
the inherent mistrust issues which co-exists in each case. 
2.3 Conditions of Trust- Performance trust, permeability trust, System Based 
trust and Relational Bonding trust 
Wong et al, (2004) used fourteen attributes (conditions or criteria) of trust to determine 
the four factors (categories) of trust which affected partnering projects in Hong Kong.  
The survey was sent out to private and public sector developers, consultant firms and 
contractor firms. Results from this study demonstrated that 3 of the 4 factors were 
important to Developers/Consultant/Contractor; namely performance trust, permeability 
trust and system based trust. 
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2.3.1 Performance trust  
(performance and permeability can build trust but is dependent upon change in attitude 
in system-based trust). Competence trust defined to be based on one’s perception of the 
other’s capacity to perform (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003) can also be known as 
performance trust.  
The trust attributes or trust conditions according to Wong et al, (2005a) which 
determine performance trust are: competence, problem solving, unity, alignment, 
respect. 
2.3.2 Permeability trust:  
openness to sharing information. Can also be known as integrity trust whichis found 
upon one’s perception of the other’s attitude to act ethically and be motivated not to 
take one’s advantage (Wong & Cheung, 2004). 
The trust attributes or trust conditions which determine permeability trust according to 
Wong et al, (2005a) are: communication, openness, information flow and financial. 
2.3.3 System-based trust:  
(most important). Can also be known as institution-based trust legal systems, conflict 
management and cooperation, systems regulating education and professional practice 
were suggested as tools to sharp trust in institutions (Rousseau et al, 1998). 
The trust attributes or trust conditions which determine system-based trust according to 
Wong et al, (2005a) are: Adopt ADR, reputation and satisfactory terms. 
2.3.4 Relational trust:  
(less relevant to the construction industry): trust arisen by continual interactions 
between individuals. Emotions and personal attachments are also influential to the 
trusting relationship (Rousseau et al, 1998). 
The trust attributes or trust conditions which determine relational bonding trust 
according to Wong et al, (2005a) are: compatibility and long- term relations. 
It would be beneficial to examine the level of these four types of trust under the five 
situations identified by Lindenberg (2000). The results would demonstrate the strength 
of the three type of trust and highlight the prominent conditions of each type of trust. 
This will assist project managers to predict the likely future behaviour of their project 
partners as well as team colleagues with an understanding of why a behaviour or 
reaction has or will occur under the condition of trust or mistrust.  
3 Research aims 
This research aims to develop a framework to explore the conditions of trust between 
ALT and AMT relationship within project alliancing. This research also aims to develop 
a robust trust framework which can improve the understanding of the theory to support 
trust in alliancing, in particular the ALT and AMT relationship to improve project 
success factors 
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3.1 Research objectives 
 
• Find the conditions of trust from the perspectives of the ALT and AMT teams of 
project alliancing which encourage cooperative attitude under the five situations 
in the normative framework identified by Siegwart Lindenberg (2000). 
• Develop a trust framework that demonstrates the how the conditions of trust can 
be embedded in the ALT and AMT relationship to improve project success 
factors performance whilst allowing inherent mistrust to co-exist.  
4 Research Methodology 
Yin’s (2003) model of assessing which methodology is best appropriate for the research 
questions investigated suggests that if a question is endeavoring to find out how or why 
of a particular phenomenon and there is no need for the control of events but there is a 
focus on contemporary events then a case study approach is the best method for 
research. For this research, case study approach will be the best approach to examining 
the perceptions of trust in relationships as project alliacning is unique in nature, scope 
and particularise so generalisation from quantitative analysis would not justify the 
benefits of qualitative research, particularly in complex situations some of the critical 
factors which may have an impact on the conditions of trust and confidence in 
relationships. Case studies can also highlight the preconditions which are important 
when interpreting the results. 
The Soft System Methodology (SSM) Approach will be used to develop a trust 
framework. There may be some inherent mistrusting behaviour which would always co-
exist with trusting behaviours therefore the issues relating to trust may not be easily 
defined as different stakeholders would have very different views on what constitutes a 
problem in construction. This makes the soft system approach an appropriate 
methodology to explore trust issues within relationship as SSM treats the notion of a 
system as an epistemological rather than an ontological entity meaning that there are 
different ways of understanding what is going on rather than defining which 
descriptions are right or wrong (Checkland & Poulter, 2006).  
5 Development of trust framework based on Lindenberg (2000) 
The factors of trust which are relevant to this research are: Performance trust, 
permeability trust and System based trust. Additionally, the conditions of trust identified 
by Thompson (1997) are also relevant namely, receptivity, promise-fulfilment, 
consistency/experience, integrity, loyalty, fairness, openness, competence, discretion, 
availability.  
Using the issues that has been identified in Mills and Harley (2010) report on the 
performance of Project Alliancing, the trust classifications and the levels of trust which  
follows in the following four tables:  
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Table 5.1 Classification of ALT’s below average performance areas into trust types and situation as identified 
by Siegwart Lindenberg (2000). 
Situation as identified by Siegwart 
Lindenberg (2000) 
 
Trust types ALT performing BELOW 
expectations 
Mishap situation Performance trust Bogged down in detail-not enough 
strategic thinking 
Need situation Performance trust Not necessarily wanting to get 
involved in the micro 
management issues that were 
impacting on the function of the 
AMT 
Common Good situation Performance trust/ 
Permeability trust 
Areas of improvement include 
risk management, forecasting and 
earned value reporting, schedule 
recovery during construction, 
safety 
Need situation Performance trust The ALT provided very little 
real/material leadership or onsite 
support to the AMT. The AMT 
had to consistently seek out 
members of the ALT for support 
and assistance, with little 
proactive response back from the 
ALT 
Breach Temptation situation  System based trust Governance 
 
Table 5.1 demonstrates that for mishap and need situation, performance trust is the trust 
that requires further understanding and improvement from the ALT team within the 
alliance relationship. For common good situation, both performance trust and 
permeability trust require improvement and under breach temptation situation, system 
based trust require further improvement.  
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  Table 5.2 Classification of AMT’s below average performance areas into trust types and situation as 
identified by Siegwart Lindenberg (2000). 
Situation as identified by Siegwart 
Lindenberg (2000) 
 
Trust types AMT performing BELOW 
expectations 
Need situation have  Performance trust Capacity to appropriate Change 
control resources on board when 
needed 
Common Good situation Performance trust Community stakeholder 
management 
Mishap situation Performance trust Setting safety standards in regard 
to protection of citizens on and 
around construction site 
Sharing situation/ 
Common Good situation 
Performance trust Improvement required in the area 
of cost control 
Common Good situation Performance trust Lack of in-house schedule 
programming skills 
Mishap situation/ 
Breach Temptation situation 
System based trust Too caught up in Alliance 
behaviour and not concentrating 
on the contract and its 
relationships 
Sharing situation/ 
Breach Temptation situation 
Performance trust / 
System based trust  
Verification model for the D&C 
stages 
Common Good situation/ 
Mishap situation 
Permeability trust Improving information flow to the 
ALT 
 
Table 5.2 demonstrates that for need and sharing situations, performance trust requires 
further understanding and improvement from the AMT team within the alliance 
relationship. For mishap situation, performance trust, permeability trust as well as 
system based trust require improvement. For common good situation, both performance 
trust and permeability trust require improvement and under breach temptation situation, 
system based trust is the issue. 
Lindenberg’s (2000) framework with the five situations is reflected in the above two 
tables which demonstrates that a theory can be developed regarding the role of trust 
within the ALT and AMT relationship. The issues identified by Mills and Harley (2010) 
demonstrate that performance and system based trust are the main type of trust that 
require further understanding and improvement for alliancing projects. It is interesting 
that performance trust affects all five situations. Trust is vital for the effectiveness of 
Alliances. Little research has been undertaken in this area therefore Lindenberg’s 
framework can convey deeper insights into the complexity of trust and mistrust. 
6 Limitations 
This research will relie on in-depth investigation of small sample size of case study 
projects specific to Australia only with a focus on public sector infrastructure projects.  
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7 Conclusion 
This paper introduces a conceptual trust framework to examine the trust between ALT 
and AMT teams for project alliancing based on Siegwart Lindenberg’s (2000) five 
situation normative framework. Data from previous research in the performance of 
alliance has been used to verify the proposed framework.  This research is trying to 
understand trust in the context of project alliancing in Australia as there are an 
increasing number of construction projects using the alliancing procurement method. 
The framework will be developed to improve project success factors within the alliance.  
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